Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Business Faculty Articles and Research

Business

10-1993

The Value Line Enigma Extended - An Examination Of the
Performance Of Option Recommendations
Jack B. Broughton
Chapman University, broughto@chapman.edu

Don M. Chance
Louisiana State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Broughton, John B., and Don M. Chance. "The Value Line enigma extended: An examination of the
performance of option recommendations." Journal of Business (1993): 541-569.
DOI:10.1086/296617

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business at Chapman University Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Business Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of
Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

The Value Line Enigma Extended - An Examination Of the Performance Of Option
Recommendations
Comments
This article was originally published in Journal of Business in 1993. DOI: 10.1086/296617

Copyright
University of Chicago Press

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/
business_articles/8

John B. Broughton
Chapman University

Don M. Chance
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

The Value Line Enigma
Extended: An Examination of
the Performance of Option
Recommendations*

I.

Introduction

The performance of investment recommendations has been studied at great length. Most of
this research has focused on equities recommendedby securities analysts (Grothet al. 1978,
1979; Stanley, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum1981;
Bjerring,Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1983). A
numberof these studies have evaluated the performance of Value Line, a well-known investment advisory service. The results of Black
(1973), Holloway (1981), Copeland and Mayers
(1982), Stickel (1985), Huberman and Kandel
(1987, 1990), Lee and Park (1987), Peterson
(1987),and Hall and Tsay (1988)have shown that
Value Line stock rankings have significant information content and that abnormal returns
* This articlewas presentedat the eleventhannualAMEX
OptionsColloquiumin New York, the FinancialManagement
Association and Southern Finance Association. We would
like to acknowledgecomments, assistance, and encouragement from the referee, Doug Diamond (the editor), Steve
Figlewski, Doug Patterson, Tom Gosnell, Vahan Janjigian,
JimJordan,R. StaffordJohnson, MartiSubrahmanyam,Peter Abken, and Raman Kumar, Dilip Shome, and seminar
participantsat FloridaState University,GroupeESSEC, and
VirginiaPolytechnicInstituteand State University.Financial
supportwas providedby the financedepartmentsat Florida
StateandVirginiaPolytechnicInstituteand State University.

We extend the research
on the Value Line
Enigmaby examining
the performanceof call
recommendationsin
Value Line Options.

Galai'shedge decomposition procedureidentifies the componentsof
the calls' returns.Abnormalcall returns
were most pronounced
immediatelyfollowing
the purchase, which is
consistent with studies
of Value Line's stock
rankings.The largest
and most significantabnormalperformance
was by calls assigned
the highest rank written on stocks judged
by Value Line to be
correctlypriced. Abnormalcall returnperformanceby joint call
and stock ranks was
consistent with the hypothesis that Value
Line identifiesunderpricedcall options.

(Journal of Business, 1993, vol. 66, no. 4)
? 1993by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.
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mightbe possible for investors using the service. These findingshave
often been referredto as the "Value Line Enigma."
Value Line's stock recommendationsare publishedin its ValueLine
Investment Survey. In addition, Value Line provides option recommendationsin its Value Line Options. Both are publishedthe firstfour
Mondays of the month. A natural extension of tests of the "Value
Line Enigma" with respect to equities is the examinationand testing
of option recommendations. The question is interesting in its own
right,given the dearthof studies on the performanceof option recommendations.However, since the recommendationsare made by Value
Line, with its well-documentedhistory of superiorstock recommendations, the question is even more interesting. Call (put) options can
performwell because the underlyingstocks performwell (poorly)and/
or because the options are mispriced. Thus, if Value Line's option
recommendationsperformwell, it will be necessary to identifywhether
the superiorperformanceis simply a leveragingof the performanceof
Value Line's stock selections or whether Value line truly has the ability to identify options mispricedwith respect to the stock.
This research has two specific objectives, which parallel the two
majorobjectives of previous research on Value Line's stock rankings
and recommendations:(1) to determine whether there is information
in Value Line's option rankingsand recommendations,and (2) to determinewhether an investor following Value Line's option recommendationsandprescribedstrategyearns abnormalreturns.To accomplish
the first objective, we examine the impact of option recommendations
on option returns aroundthe recommendationdates. In addition, we
analyze the relationshipbetween option performanceand option rank
and the combined option and stock ranking. In pursuingthe second
objective, we examine the performance of option recommendations
over holdingperiods defined by Value Line itself.
Our study focuses on recommendationsto buy call options. Call
buying, as opposed to put buying or combinationstrategies;is by far
the largest single category of recommendations, and calls are well
known to lead puts in volume. Although there may be some interest
in examiningother strategies, the recommendationsare not available
on computerdisks or tape and had to be collected by hand. In addition,
each recommendationhas to be monitored every week thereafter.
Thus, the time and expense of collecting and monitoringrecommendations for puts and less popularoption strategieswould have been substantialand we deemed that their investigationshouldbe left for future
research.
This article is divided into five sections. Section II describes the
methodologyand the issues involved in testing the recommendations.
Section III describes the data set and provides a summaryof the characteristicsof the sample. Section IV presents the results, and Section
V contains a summaryand our conclusions.
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II. Methodology and Procedural Issues
A.

Value Line Options

Each issue of Value Line Options contains two sections, the "Option
Strategist"section and the "Option Evaluation" section. Value Line
employs a rankingsystem with options rankedfrom 1 to 5, where 1 is
the highestrankingand 5 is the lowest. This is the same rankingsystem
Value Line uses to rank stocks. The Option Strategistrecommendsa
groupof options for each of the strategiesof naked call buying, naked
call writing, naked put buying, naked put writing, and covered call
writing. These options are a subset of all options evaluated and are
consideredto be those most highly recommended. For example, options recommendedfor naked call buyingare ranked1 and their underlying stocks are ranked 1, 2, or 3, with 1 being the highest stock rank
and 3 being the middle stock rank. Value Line provides a set of seven
stock prices and an associated option price for each. The subscriber
is instructedto execute the transactionif the option can be obtained
at a price equal to or less than the one associated with the current
stock price.' Consider the following recommendationon September
12, 1983, for the IBM October 110 call:
Stock Price 118.00 120.00 121.00 121.88 122.00 123.00 125.00
OptionPrice 10.61 12.14 12.92 13.63 13.73 14.54 16.23
The "recent stock price" was 121.88. The subscriber is instructed
to determine the current stock price, locate it in the above table or
interpolate,and buy the call if it can be obtained for an amount less
than or equal to the indicated price. Thus, these call prices can be
viewed as limit prices contingenton the stock price. Once purchased,
the subscriber is advised to monitor the rank of the option in the
Option Evaluation section of subsequent issues and to sell when the
rankfalls to 3 or below. Whilethe OptionEvaluationsection is primarily used for monitoringthe option ranks, it containsadditionalinformation includingthe stock rankand Value Line's opinionof the "normal"
price of the option, which is based upon the recent stock price and
the time to expiration from the publication date. The normal price
is tantamountto Value Line's conditional estimate of the option's
equilibrium value. Value Line uses a proprietary option pricing
model.

1. Obviously, with only seven stock prices, some interpolationis necessary. Value
Line indicates that its choice of the seven stock prices is based on what it calls the
"recent stock price," which is usually the closing stock price (or an estimate thereof)
for the Tuesdayprecedingthe publicationdate. In almost all cases, stock prices on the
Mondayissue date are containedwithin this range.
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Value Line prepareseach issue on the Tuesday before the Monday
publicationdate, and the issues are mailedtwo days later. This creates
the possibilitythat an investor could receive the issue on Friday. With
Saturday mail service available, some investors could receive it on
Saturday. Most investors should receive theirs by Monday. We assume that serious users of the service will make arrangementsto have
the issue delivered in time to begin searchingfor transactionson Monday morning.Moreover, conversations with Value Line personnel indicate that they are relatively confidentthat the issues are in investors'
hands by Monday morning.
B. Decomposing the Return on an Option
It is well known from the theory of option pricing that an option can
be replicatedby an appropriateweightingof positions in the stock and
a risk-free bond. Boyle and Emanuel (1980), Galai (1983), and Galai
and Geske (1984) have shown how an option's returncan be decomposed into the interest on funds committed, the leveraging of the
stock's return,any mispricingon the option, and a residualassociated
with adjustmentof the hedge at discrete intervals. Here we present a
summaryof the Galai version of the model. Readers unfamiliarwith
the details are referredto Galai's paper.
Suppose that at time t - 1, an investor establishes a long position
in a call, which has an actual price of CA1, and a short position in h
shares of stock priced at St.- The model price of the call is CMI and
a continuouslyadjustedhedge where ht_ = &CM1
lISt_1 should yield
a risk-freereturn.If it does not, there is an excess hedge returndefined
as
RXH,

A

=

-

hR5, - I

(1)

1(er-1),

where R , is defined as the actual dollar call return, which is the call
price at t minus the call price at t - 1, Rs, is the dollar returnon the
stock, IA,I is the investment in the hedge, and r is the risk-free rate
per period. Since we are buying calls and shortingstock, It_- is negative. The excess hedge returnresults from a change in the difference
between the model and actual call prices over the period t - 1 to t.
We call this the "call selectivity," which is defined as
RG-

C

-

CM -

(CAt

-

CM 1)

(2)

where the superscriptM refers to the model, or theoreticallycorrect,
price of the call.
The actual returnon the call can be decomposed as follows:
A =

[IA-1

-

(CA-1 - CM1)](er

-

1) + hR51+ RG1+

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 14:04:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

I,

(3)

545

Value Line Enigma

where mtresults from adjustingthe hedge at discrete intervals rather
than continuously. We shall refer to this as the hedge slippage. The
componentsof the return on the call are, thus, the opportunitycost
on the actual investment in the hedge adjustedfor the difference between the actual and model call prices, the return on the stock, the
change in the mispricing on the call and the hedge slippage. If the
optionwere correctly priced and the hedge adjustedcontinuously,the
returnwould consist of only the interest on the actual investmentand
the stock return.This highlightsthe comparabilityof options and marginedstock positions. The interest is analogousto margininterest, and
the hedge ratio reflects the leverage inherentin options.
There are a number of alternative option performanceevaluation
techniques.Galaiand Geske (1984),in additionto illustratingthe above
method,propose a security marketline (SML) approach,while Evnine
andRudd(1984)develop a multifactormodelfor optionrisk adjustment
in the spiritof the arbitragepricingtheory (APT). Whilethese methods
have merits of their own, each is subject to potential problemsin the
choice of a marketindex and the relevant factors that determineasset
prices, as well as econometric problems in the estimation of APT or
SML parameters.Galai's hedging decompositionprocedure,based as
it is on option pricingtheory, places far fewer restrictionson investor
preferences than general equilibriummodels. Furthermore,equation
(3) is especially appropriatefor evaluatingValue Line's option recommendations. Value Line's stock selection ability should appear in
hRs,, and its ability to find mispricedoptions should be manifestedin
RG,. Because the hedging decomposition procedure is based on the
principlethat risk enters the equations only by a failure to adjust the
hedge continuously,there is no requirementto make a risk adjustment
to the option returns.Risk is capturedby mt.With a synchronizeddata
set, the procedureshouldgive reasonableestimates of the performance
of the calls and their components. We emphasizethat investors would
not necessarily establish risk-free hedges of a long call and a short
stock. In fact, Value Line recommendsthat these calls simply be purchased outright.The hedge procedureis but a convenientmethodology
for decomposing a call's return. Our interest lies in the excess hedge
returns, RxH,, and, especially, the call selectivity component, RG.2
2. Relative to RXH,, the call selectivity component,RG, is a more robust measureof
optionperformance.The excess hedge returncan be writtenas
RXH, = RG, + (CM,l

-

CA i)(er

-

1) +

t.

We see fromthis equationthatRXH, will differfromRG, by the amountof interestearned
on the differencebetween the model and actual call prices at t - 1 and by the residual
returnassociated with the hedge slippage, ,. The interest earned on the call price
differentialis likely to be small in most cases, with the dominantcause of differences
in the performancemeasuresrepresentedby X,. Because RG, representsthe change in
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While Value Line's stock selection ability should appear in hRSt, we
must recognize that it is not adjusted for risk. In a later section we
shall discuss the adjustmentof the stock componentfor risk.
Long call positions may be recommendedfor the following reasons:
(1) the underlyingstock is undervalued,or (2) the option is undervalued relative to the current stock price, or (3) both 1 and 2. At any
point in time, an option can be classified along two dimensions: the
option rank and the stock timeliness rank. Ceteris paribus,the higher
the stock rankis, the higherthe option rankis. It is, therefore,possible
to develop hypotheses concerning call selectivity and excess hedge
returnsusing the joint call and stock ranks. If Value Line is able to
identify undervaluedcalls, we would expect that highly ranked calls
writtenon nonhighlyrankedstocks would exhibit the largestabnormal
performance.
C.

The Empirical Procedures
The selection of recommendations.

The database, described in the

following section, contains all quote and trade records on the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) over the period January 1983December 1985. Beginningwith the first week duringthis period, call
options recommended in the Option Strategist section are screened
for purchase. The search procedure involved screening all quotes on
recommendedcalls and selecting the first quote for a given call in
which the ask price was at or below the limit price. The search began
on the Monday publicationdate and proceeded throughthe following
Friday, stopping only when the transaction could be executed and,
thus, allowingfor the possibility that the ask price mightnever be less
than or equal to the limit price.3 We considered only quotes between
10:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. central time, which omits the first hour after
the opening. This gives the market a period of time to adjust to overnight informationthat might cause unusual price behavior.
the deviationbetween marketand model prices, it is relativelyinsensitiveto systematic
biases in actual or model call prices. A potentialproblemwith this measureis that if
the call option is held until expiration,the actual and model call prices must converge
and resultin a positive value of RG,- In the present study, however, none of the options
are held until expiration.Value Line decreases the ranks of options recommendedfor
naked long positions if the actual and model call prices fail to converge and the rank
reductionwill triggerthe terminationof the option holdingperiod. The measuredvalue
of RG, will be nonpositivein such cases and accuratelyreflect the failureof the Value
Line model. If the actual and model prices do converge, Value Line will lower the
option rank to reflect the correct marketvaluationof the option, and a positive value
of RG, will be measured.
3. As noted earlier,only seven stock prices are shown by Value Line for each recommendation.Since the theoreticalcall price/stock pricefrontieris convex, linearinterpolation induces a slight bias, which could permit options to be bought at higher than
justified prices. We expect this bias is very slight, however. Moreover, Value Line
specificallyrecommendslinear interpolationso it would be inappropriateto test their
recommendationswithoutfollowingtheir advice to the letter.
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In screeningrecommendationsfor purchase, we used the actual ask
quote for the call. Our database, however, did not provide bid-ask
quotes for the stock. We considered using the method of capturing
repeatedreversionsproposedby Bhattacharya(1983)to estimate stock
bid-ask prices. Unfortunately, that technique results in jettisoning
transactionswith no price change and, thus, could omit many profitableopportunities.We, thus, decided to use the stock transactionprice
and, if it proved subsequently necessary, to adjust the returns by a
percentageto reflect the stock bid-ask spread. Since we are not comparing stock prices against an equilibrium stock price, the bias of
choosing transactions on the wrong side of the market (Phillips and
Smith 1980)is a problem only for the call options since they must be
executable at or below the limit price. Without the option bid-ask
prices, we could not obtain the correct set of transactablerecommendations, but, fortunately, our data set permits us to do so and, thus,
to avoid the bias.
Thehedge procedure. As noted by Galai (1983), the hedge decompositionprocedurefocuses on changes in the differencebetween market and model prices so that the effect of any systematic mispricing
by the tested model is largely mitigated.In other words, the procedure
is designed to detect whether there is a tendency for the market and
modelprices to converge, not whether the model generatesprices that
are unbiasedestimates of the observed marketprice at every moment
in time. Moreover, since our option sample spans a broad range of
expirationsand degrees of moneyness, any model pricingbiases should
be minor and unrelatedto the options' ranks.
In the present study, the decomposition procedure is a vehicle for
testing the accuracy of Value Line's (unobserved) option pricing
model. Under ideal conditions, option prices and hedge ratios from
the model would be available continuously. These data would then
be used to determine whether movements in market call prices are
anticipatedby the Value Line model. Unfortunately,model.information is updatedonly at weekly intervals. In orderto adjustthe position
and measurereturnsat more frequentintervals, it is necessary to construct a proxy for the Value Line model.
Because the subject of our tests is an option pricing model that
cannot be observed, the paramountcriterion in selecting a proxy is
that the selected model generate prices and hedge ratios that conform
reasonablyclosely to those publishedweekly by Value Line. We have
found that the Barone-Adesiand Whaley (1987)and MacMillan(1986)
model (hereafter BWM), which is an analytic approximationfor an
Americanoption, satisfies this criterion. The "normal" call price and
the "recent stock price," which are reported weekly in the Option
Evaluation section, represent an equilibriumcall price/stock price
combinationfrom Value Line's unobserved option pricingmodel. We
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use the BWM model in conjunction with the normal call and most
recent stock prices to calculate an implied volatility. This serves as
our estimate of Value Line's opinion of the standarddeviation of the
stock's return.The model call price and hedge ratio, which is obtained
by differentiatingthe BWM formula with respect to the stock price,
are calculatedusing this estimate and the currentobserved stock price.
For each day up to and including the next issue date of Value Line
Options, the volatility estimate is used with the observed stock price
to estimatea model call price and hedge ratio. A new volatilityestimate
is calculated on the next issue date, and this estimate is used for the
followingweek. The procedureof using the previous week's volatility
estimate to calculate an issue date returnprecludes recordinga large
and positive call selectivity return through a sudden lowering of the
Value Line volatility parameteron the issue date. The position is held
until a new issue ranks the option at 3 or below or does not rank the
option.4The position is terminated using the first quote after 10:00
A.M. on the Monday of the rank change.
In some cases an option we were holdingdid not have a quote during
a given day. In those cases we did not record a returnfor that day.
On the next day on which a quote was available,we did not, however,
recorda multidayreturn.Returnswere calculatedonly if observations
were availableon consecutive tradingdays.
III.

The Data

Optionand stock price data are obtained from the resorted format of
the Berkeley Options Data Base, which provides a time-stampedrecord of virtually every option trade and bid-ask quote on the CBOE.
The risk-free rate is taken as the continuously compoundedyield on
the Treasury-billwith a maturitydate closest to the expirationdate of
the option. The Treasury-billrates were collected from the WallStreet
Journal and were updated each Monday. Dividend informationwas
provided in Value Line Options.

The tests covered the period 1983-85 and included all issues of
ValueLine Options over that period. There were 12,699call purchase
recommendations,rangingfrom a weekly low of 47 to a weekly high
of 120. The average numberof weekly recommendationswas 88. All
of the recommendedcalls were ranked 1 at the time of the recommendation and represent a subset of 27,019 calls ranked 1 over the 3-year
period.
Because of the use of the Berkeley Options Data Base, the sample
was restrictedto CBOE options. There were 6,360 CBOE calls recomended, which is about 50%of all calls recommended.5The three most
4. In some cases an option was no longer ranked. We interpretedthis as a rank of
below 2 and thereuponterminatedthe position.
5. This is a slightlysmallerpercentagethan the CBOE's marketshareof about60%,
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TABLE 1

Sample Characteristics

Months

A. All CBOE recommendations:
In-the-money
At-the-money
Out-of-the-money
Total

0-1

1-2

2-3

3-6

6-9

Total

371
68
50
489

588
39
231
858

443
51
244
738

841
881
914
2,636

446
734
459
1,639

2,689
1,773
1,898
6,360

M = 1.06, D = 132

B. All transactable
recommendations:
In-the-money
At-the-money
Out-of-the money
Total

235
64

286
59

217
50

469
558

255
439

1,462
1,170

28
327

153
498

174
441

585
1,612

277
971

1,217
3,849

M = 1.04, D = 130
C. Stratified random

sampleof transactable
recommendations:
32
In-the-money
12
At-the-money
3
Out-of-the-money

31
6
14

27
5
20

46
62
54

47
83
53

183
168
144

47

51

52

162

183

495

Total

M = 1.04, D = 145
NOTE.-Thesetotals representCBOE call options recommendedfor purchaseby Value Line in
1983-85(panel A), the subset of that sample that could be purchasedby the end of the week of
publication(panelB), and the finalsample,a stratifiedrandomsampleof the executabletransactions
(panelC). Totalsare stratifiedby moneyness,M,, whereM, = S,e- TIXe-rT, where8 is the dividend
yield, r is the risk-freerate, X is the exercise price, and T is the time to expiration.In-the-moneyis
definedas M, > 1.05, and out-of-the-moneyis definedas M, < 0.95; D is the averagenumberof
based
days to expiration,andM is averagemoneyness.Numberof monthsis a close approximation
on dividingnumberof days to maturityby averagenumberof days per month.

heavily representedstocks were IBM (430), GeneralDynamics (417),
and MerrillLynch (410). Summarystatistics are presented in panel A
of table 1. About 42% were in-the-money, about 28% were within
? 5 percent of at-the-money,and the remaining30%were out-of-themoney. About 41% of the calls had expirations of 3-6 months, and
about26%had expirationsof 6-9 months. Thus, there is a tendencyfor
the recommendationson CBOE calls to be intermediate-to long-term
options. The average call was 6% in-the-money and expired in 132
days.
Of the 6,360 CBOE call recommendations,3,849, or about 61%,had
an ask quote at or below the limit price by Friday of the issue week.
which may suggest that CBOE options are more likely perceivedby Value Line to be
correctlypriced. This is an interestingissue itself but one we do not pursuehere.
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Of these transactablerecommendations,about 58% were purchased
on Monday, 20%on Tuesday, 10%on Wednesday, 7% on Thursday,
and 5% on Friday. Sample characteristics of the executable CBOE
recommendationsare presented in panel B of table 1. The ability to
execute a tradefor the recommendedoptions is apparentlynot associated with any particularsample characteristics.The executable transactions also tended to be more intermediateto longer-termand in-themoney calls. The average call was in-the-money by 4% and had an
expirationof 130 days. Of these 3,849 calls, over two-thirdswere repeat recommendations.That is, the call was recommendedin a given
week and recommendedagainin the next week or a subsequentweek.
This left only 1,152 unique recommendations.Because of the enormous data collection requirementsinvolved in monitoringopen positions, we chose to pare this sample down to a set of 500, which were
selected using a stratifiedrandomsampledesigned to obtaina distribution of moneyness and time to expirationcomparableto the full set of
1,152. In executing the opening transactions,five short-termnear-themoney options were lost due to nonconvergenceof the impliedvolatility routine,leaving a final sample of 495. Sample characteristicsof this
groupare presentedin panel C of table 1. The final sample seems quite
representativeof the originalsample. Calls tended to be intermediateto long-termand in-the-money.By removingrepeatrecommendations,
the average maturitywill obviously be longer and was here 145 days.
The averagemoneyness was about the same as that of the transactable
recommendationsat about 4% in-the-money.An average of less than
two recommendationswere executed on the same day. This is particularly favorable since it greatly minimizes the possibility that heteroskedasticity/contemporaneousmispricingwill bias the results.
The mean holding period was 97.31 calendardays, and the median
was 83 calendardays. Over the sample holding periods, these recom-,
mendationsproduced over 29,000 daily returns. Because of potential
extreme errorsin the data on the Berkeley options tape, we examined
a sample of cases in which the market and model prices showed very
large differences. When the price we had chosen was well out of line
with the surroundingprices, we replaced it with the next price.
IV. EmpiricalResults
The first part of this section reports the results of our analysis of the
periods immediatelybefore and after the date on which a Value Line
subscriberwould establish a position. The second part of this section
evaluates the performanceof the call recommendationsover the holding period specificallyrecommendedby Value Line. As describedearlier, this period begins on purchase of the option at or below the limit
price and ends when the option is no longer ranked 1 or 2. The third
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part of this section examines performanceaccording to option rank
and the combined option and stock rankings. In the fourth part, we
evaluatethe extent to which recommendedcall options are low priced
relativeto correspondingput options and the underlyingstock in the
periodaroundthe recommendationdate. We conduct some additional
tests in the fifth part of this section and conclude with an analysis of
the underlyingstock returns.
Our return measures are stated in terms of dollars per contract.
Because of the small size of the initial value of the position, option
returnsare typicallyexpressed in this fashion ratherthanas percentage
returns(see, e.g., Galai 1977). Defining returnsthis way not only reduces skewness in the returns but also facilitates applicationof the
per-contracttradingcosts reported by Phillips and Smith (1980). Because we do not anticipatethat Value Line's advice will be perverse,
we conduct one-tailed tests.
A.

Event Time Analysis

In this section we evaluate the performanceof the recommendedcalls
in the window beginning5 tradingdays prior to establishmentof the
position and extending to 10 trading days afterward.There are two
importantfacts to note. First, recall that Value Line subscriberspurchase recommendedcall options when the market ask price is at or
below the limit price. This may or may not occur on the Monday
recommendationdate. Thus, we define day 0 as the date on which the
marketask price satisfies the limit price. Second, the selection criterion guaranteesthat we observe a strong positive difference between
the model and marketprices on the day of the purchase.The questions
of interest are, Is there subsequent convergence of the market and
modelprices and, if so, when does convergencetake place? Significant
convergence would support the notion that Value Line is capable of
identifyingunderpricedcalls, while lack of convergence would invalidate this notion. If Value Line's recommendationshave information
content, then convergence of the marketand model prices should occur at or shortly after the purchase date.
Table 2 contains the mean difference between the model call price
and the average of the bid and ask call prices for each trading day
duringthe period beginning 1 week prior to the purchase date and
ending 2 weeks afterward. We use the average of the bid and ask
prices to facilitate comparison of returns between days. A graphical
representationis provided in figure 1. Over the week priorto the purchase date the mean differenceis positive and shows a slight tendency
to decline. On day 0 (the purchase date) there is a sharpupwardspike
in the difference, averagingabout $0.77 per call. This is the signalthat
subscribersact on when followingValue Line's recommendations.The
differencebetween the model and quote price drops sharplythe next
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TABLE 2

Performance around the Purchase Date

Day

CM- CA

RG,

-5
-4
- 3
- 2
- 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

.537(.036)
.504(.033)
.484(.030)
.468(.028)
.471(.030)
.766(.029)
.551(.031)
.530(.032)
.495(.031)
.491(.032)
.442(.032)
.451(.030)
.455(.030)
.429(.029)
.410(.029)
.357(.031)

.981(1.924)
2.198(1.738)
.852(1.874)
- 1.090(1.400)
.424(1.965)
- 28.114*(2.621)
21.222*(2.229)
2.531(1.705)
2.470(1.795)
2.234(2.067)
6.620*(1.846)
- .416(1.903)
- 1.157(1.406)
3.992*(1.609)
1.302(1.528)
4.407*(1.806)

NOTE.-These statistics are the sample mean values of the call
selectivitymeasure,RGT, and the differencebetween the marketand
actualprices, CM - CA. Standarderrorsare in parentheses.The optionis purchasedat the midpointof the bid-askspread,andthe hedge
is adjusteddaily using the midpointof the bid-askspread.All stock
tradesare executedat the stock transactionprice.All meansare interpretedas dollarsper contract.All values for CM - Care significant
at betterthan .01.
* Significantat the .01 level.
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FIG. 1.-Difference between model price and quote price by day. The graph
illustratesthe averagevalue of the differenceby day. Day 0 is the first day of
the holdingperiod.
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day to $0.55 and declines steadily over the 2 weeks following the purchase date. Althoughonly 10 tradingdays afterthe purchaseare shown
here, the difference stabilizes at around 30 cents after 20 days. This
difference of just over 1/4 point is within a transaction cost of the
Value Line price.
Table 2 also contains the mean values of the call selectivity componentduringthe event period, while figure2 provides a graphicalrepresentation.Note that positive (negative) values of RG,result from convergence (divergence) of model and market prices. Thus, consistent
with the evidence in figure 1, we observe call selectivity returnsnear
zero in the week prior to the purchase date. The large negative return
on the purchase date reflects the divergence of the model and quote
prices that triggerspurchase. The large positive returnon the first day
of the holding period corresponds to the significantconvergence of
modeland quote prices evident from figure 1. After day 1, we observe
positive mean values of RG, on 7 of the 9 event days in the window,
with 3 of these significantat .01. Although not shown here, the mean
selectivity returnfollows a randompatternaroundzero for the remainder of the holding period.
There is some concern that dividends aroundthe event date might
imparta bias to these findings.Dividends and the attendantearly exercise that they sometimes induce could affect these results. We reran
30

20E-d/-1
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FIG. 2.-Call selectivity componentby holdingperiod day. The graphillustratesthe averagevalue of RG,by each day of the holdingperiod. Day 0 is the
firstday of the holdingperiod.
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these tests removing all calls in which the stock went ex-dividend
within 5 days of the purchase date. The results were nearly identical.
These results seem to indicate that Value Line does provide useful
informationand that most of the informationin Value Line's recommendationsis impoundedvery rapidlyinto the option's price. Most of
the convergence between model and quote prices takes place on the
first day of the holding period. Two weeks after the purchase date,
mean call selectivity returns are essentially zero. As reportedearlier,
the average length of the holding period was 97.31 days. Thus, it appears that Value Line's recommendationto buy is timely, but its recommendationto sell is late. Holding the position beyond 2-4 weeks
is at best a neutral position and ties up funds that might be more
profitablyused elsewhere.
B.

Performance Analysis following Value Line's Recommended
Strategy

In this section, we report the results from following Value Line's recommended strategy of holding the option positions until the option
ranks are no longer 1 or 2. We report two sets of results in order to
evaluate the impact of the bid-ask spread. In the first set, the call
options are assumed to be purchased and sold at the midpointof the
bid-ask spread. We then adopt the more realistic assumptionthat the
call options are purchased at the ask price and sold at the bid price.
In both cases, our daily hedge adjustmentsare made through stock
transactions, and the call price used in determiningthe appropriate
hedge ratio is the average of the bid and ask price. We emphasizethat
an actual Value Line subscriberis not advised to form hedge portfolios. This methodology is used only to isolate the components of the
options' returns.6
Panel A of table 3 contains the estimatedmeans and standarddeviations for the actual and model call returns and the call selectivity,
the stock return, and the excess hedge return components. Without
consideringthe effect of the bid-ask spread, the mean actual returnis
$1.064per contract and the mean model returnis -$0.315. This leads
to a mean call selectivity componentof $1.379 per contractper trading
day, which is significantat .01. (Note that the call selectivity returnis
the actualreturnminusthe model return.)The stock returncomponent
is positive and significant,which likely reflectsthe normalpositive rate
6. The hedge methodologyhas been used to decompose the actual returnon a call
option (see eq. [3]). The hedge is not riskless if the hedge slippageterm, rj, exhibits
systematicrisk. The correlationbetween the hedge slippagemeasureand the returnon
the value-weightedCenterfor Researchin SecurityPrices (CRSP)marketportfoliowas
.01. However, there are obviously some individualhedges in which some systematic
riskremainsandeven some cases where the hedge slippagecould have negativecorrelation with the marketportfolio.
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TABLE 3

Summary Statistics on Call and Stock Performance over Entire
Holding Period

A. Overall performance:
Without bid-ask effects
With bid-ask effects
B. By call rank:
Rank 1 (N = 18,682)
Rank 2 (N = 10,350)
Rank 3 (N = 111)
C. By call and stock rank:
Call rank 1:
Stock rank 1
(N = 10,245)
Stock rank 2
(N = 7,490)
Stock rank 3
(N = 923)
Call rank 2:
Stock rank 1
(N = 2,228)
Stock rank 2
(N = 5,598)
Stock rank 3
(N = 2,491)

A

hRs,

RXH

1.379**
(.193)
.927**
(.192)

1.336**
(.514)
...

.894**
(.193)
.442*
(.193)

.230
(.644)
-1.175
(.874)
-9.412
(6.665)

1.782**
(.249)
.598*
(.306)
2.785
(3.584)

1.742**
(.642)
.394
(.901)
- 3.698
(6.749)

1.369**
(.248)
.152
(.313)
- .676
(3.557)

.745
(.909)

1.666**
(.358)

2.283*
(.902)

1.239**
(.357)

1.432
(1.005)

-.285
(.980)

1.718**
(.357)

1.1154
(.988)

1.355**
(.354)

1.687
(2.116)

-2.043
(2.113)

3.734**
(1.016)

-.284
(2.120)

3.093**
(1.032)

.811
(1.935)

.810
(1.922)

.002
(.644)

2.758
(1.863)

-.548
(.674)

(1.157)

-1.313
(1.173)

.535
(.410)

.230
(1.173)

.179
(.416)

-1.475
(1.784)

-2.757
(1.802)

1.282*
(.646)

-.989
(1.789)

.732
(.661)

R

Rm,

RG,

1.064*
(.517)
.611
(.517)

-.315
(.516)
...

2.012**
(.648)
-.577
(.867)
- 6.627
(7.508)

2.411**
(.905)

-.778

NOTE.-Thesestatisticsreflectmeanreturnsand standarderrorsof the meansfromdailyadjusted
hedgesfor call options recommendedby Value Line. Panel A presents the results for the entire
sampleassumingthe hedge ratio is adjusteddaily using the midpointof the bid-askspread. The
resultswithoutbid-askeffects assumepurchaseand sale of the optionat the midpointof the bid-ask
spread.The results with bid-ask effects assume purchaseat the ask and sale at the bid. Panel B
presentsthe results accordingto the call rank, and panel C presentsthe results by call and stock
rank.The valueRA is the returnbased on the actualcall price, R' is the returnbased on the model
callprice,RGtis the call selectivity, hRstis the componentof the option'sreturncontributedby the
stock, and RXHtis the excess hedge return.All figuresare in dollarsper contract.Standarderrrors
are in parentheses.Missingfiguresindicate that the figure is the same as the case listed directly
aboveit.
* Significantat the .05 level.
** Significantat the .01 level.

of returnon stocks. We shall make an adjustmentof the stock component for risk in Subsection F. The mean excess hedge returnper contractis $0.894, which is significantat .01.
The effect of the bid-ask spread was quite substantial. When the
positionis establishedat the ask and closed at the bid, the mean actual
returnis reduced by over 40%. The mean call selectivity component
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is reduced by more than 30%and the mean excess hedge returnsfall
by over 50%. While both of these measures remain significant,it is
clear that the bid-ask spread imposes a heavy burden.
In addition to the cost of the bid-ask spread, traders face other
costs. Phillipsand Smith (1980)estimate the explicit transactioncosts
incurredby arbitrageurs,option market makers, and individualtraders. Floor trading and clearing costs are estimated to be $1.50 and
$1.70 per option contract and $1.00 to $4.00 per roundlot of stock for
an arbitrageur,defined as a firm or individualwith seats on both the
optionsand stock exchanges. Blomeyer and Klemkosky(1983)assume
mean tradingand clearingcosts of $1.60 per option contractand $2.50
per roundlot of stock. This impliesround-tripfloortradingand clearing
costs of $8.20. Since the daily hedge adjustments are made in the
stock, the appropriateadjustmentis $4.10 for the first and last days of
each holdingperiod and $2.50 for each intermediateday. Even without
consideringbid-askeffects, these costs are sufficientto eliminateprofit
opportunities.
C. Performance according to Option and Stock Ranks

While all options considered in this study are initially ranked 1, their
rankingsmay change over the course of the holdingperiod. Ultimately,
the holdingperiod terminateswhen the rankfalls below 2 or the option
is no longer ranked. Thus, in the analysis performedin the previous
section, the last tradingday return involves an option having a rank
of 3, 4, or 5 or an option that is unranked.In addition,over the course
of the holdingperiods the rankingof the underlyingstock may change.
This section analyzes trading day returns by call rank and call and
stock rank combinations and provides a direct test of the ranking
system.7
To facilitate comparisonsbetween ranks, returnsare calculatedusing the average of the bid and ask prices. Panel B of table 3 presenfs
the results by call rank. For rank 1 calls, the mean excess hedge return
was $1.369 per contract per trading day, which is significantat .01.
The mean actual trading day return on a naked call contract was
$2.012, while the mean model call returnwas $0.230. This results in a
mean call selectivity return of $1.782 per contract per trading day,
which is significant at .01. Comparison of the average trading day
returnon a naked call contract to the call selectivity returnindicates
that a large portion of the naked call return is associated with the
7. A caveat needs to be noted here. Since we are usingobservationsfromour holding
periods, a subtle selection bias may be introduced.We cannot state definitelythat any
differentialperformancebetween rankingsis associated solely with the ranking.The
fact that the option has been recommendedmay also affect subsequentreturns.We are
gratefulto the referee for bringingthis to our attention.
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convergenceof the Value Line model price and the marketquote price
of the call.
It is noteworthythat the excess hedge returnsare alignedin magnitude accordingto the ranks. As we would have expected based on the
resultsin SubsectionA, call selectivity is large and significantfor rank
1 calls. All returnsmeasuredin the week of purchasewere for rank 1
calls, and we found that significantconvergenceof model and observed
call prices occurs duringthis week. While the rank2 call selectivity is
significantlypositive, it is much smaller than that of rank 1. The rank
3 call selectivity is quite high, but insignificant.Inspection of the data
revealed that this average was influenced by two outliers whose removalwould have resulted in a slightlynegative call selectivity return.
Whilethis analysis has not considered brokeragecommissions, inclusion of these costs would not alter the relative performanceof the call
options.8

As described earlier, an integral component of the option ranking
process is the rank of the underlyingstock. The stock ranks ranged
from 1 to 4 over the course of the holding periods, though at the
recommendationdate all stock ranks were 1, 2, or 3. Ceteris paribus,
call ranks are positively related to the rank of the underlyingstock.
Thus, if a call option carries a high rank despite a relativelylow stock
rank,then Value Line must consider the call to be significantlyundervalued. In turn, this suggests the hypothesis that the mean excess
performanceof hedges involving calls of a given rank on relatively
lowly rankedstocks should exceed the performanceof hedges involving calls of equal rank on highly rankedstocks. We would also expect
to observe a highermean call selectivity componentfor calls of a given
rank on relatively low ranked stocks. The presumptionis that a high
call rank on a relatively low ranked stock is associated with factors
otherthan expectations of significantstock price performanceand that
the cardinalfactor amongthese is the undervaluationof the call option.
Panel C of table 3 presents the results from stratifyingthe sample
accordingto call and stock rank.The evidence supportsthe hypothesis
that a high call rank combined with a relatively low stock rank leads
to the best performance.For calls ranked 1 there is a monotonic increasein both the mean excess hedge returnand the meancall selectivity as the stock rank declines from 1 to 3.9 Of course, from our earlier
8. The averagenet investmentin the hedge did not differ significantlyor systematicallyaccordingto optionrank.In addition,the correlationbetweenactualnet investment
andexcess hedge returnwas very low at - .01. We may safely conclude, therefore,that
the differencein the magnitudeof excess hedge returnsis not due to differencesin the
dollarscale of the investmentin the hedge and consequentlyto the transactioncosts of
brokeragecommissions.
9. For calls ranked1 on stocks ranked4, the mean excess hedge returnwas negative
and insignificant.There were only 22 of these observations.
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findings,we know that most of this difference occurs aroundthe time
of the recommendation.This suggests we should find much weaker
evidence for calls ranked 2, and that is indeed the case. Althoughthe
averages line up as expected, none of the excess hedge returnswere
significant.However, the call selectivity for calls ranked 2 on stocks
ranked 3 was marginallysignificantat the .05 level, suggesting that
there may yet be some additionalprice adjustmentswhile a call is still
a recommendedhold but the stock has a relatively low ranking.
It is also interestingto note that the stock return component lines
up appropriatelywith the stock rank, which is consistent with the
findingsof others that the Value Line stock ranks do have some discriminatorypower. However, again, these have not yet been adjusted
for risk. Indeed, Copeland and Mayers (1982) found that the higher
ranked stocks did have higher betas, so these findings may actually
reflect only a normalreturn.
Table 4 presents results of tests of significanceof the difference in
meanexcess hedge returnsand call selectivity between call/stock rank
combinations.There are twelve hypothesized relationshipsin which
the expected sign of the differenceis identifiableex ante. The hypotheses may be summarizedas follows:
HYPOTHESIS1. For a given stock rank, abnormalcall performance
is largerthe higher the call rank is.
2. For a given call rank, abnormalcall performanceis
HYPOTHESIS
largerthe lower the stock rank is.
HYPOTHESIS
3. For two given calls, abnormalperformanceis larger
on the call having a higher call rank and lower stock rank.
For these hypotheses, one-tailed matched pairs t-tests are appropriate.As table 4 indicates, all twelve of the hypothesizedrelationships
hold. For the excess hedge returns, the null hypothesis is rejected in
7 of 12 cases at the .05 level and in four cases at the .01 level. For the
call selectivity returns,the null hypothesis is rejected in eight cases at
the .05 level and in three cases at the .01 level. If Value Line can
identifymispricedoptions, we would expect that the largestdifference
would be observed when the call is ranked highest (1) and the stock
is ranked relatively low (3) in comparison to the case where the call
is rankedrelativelylow (2) and the stock rankedhighest(1). The results
are consistent with that hypothesis.
D.

Relative Call, Put, and Stock Prices around the
Recommendation Dates

As noted earlier, Value Line does not provide complete details on its
procedurein assigningranks and formulatingrecommendations.If the
prevalentreason for call option recommendationsis that Value Line
believes that the markethas underestimatedfuture stock price volatility, then we should observe simultaneousrecommendationsof put and
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Tests of Differences in Mean Performance according to Call/Stock
Rank Combination

TABLE 4

Call/Stock
Rank
Combination
Mean
Difference in

Hypothesized
Larger

Hypothesized
Smaller

Mean
Difference in
RXH,

t

RG,

t

1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/1
2/2
2/3
2/3

1/1
1/2
2/1
2/2
2/3
1/1
2/1
2/2
2/1
2/1
2/1
2/2

1.854
1.738
3.641
2.914
2.361
.116
1.903
1.176
1.787
.727
1.280
.553

1.70*
1.59
2.95**
2.62**
1.93*
.23
2.50**
2.15*
2.34**
.92
1.36
.71

2.068
2.016
3.731
3.199
2.452
.052
1.716
1.183
1.663
.533
1.280
.747

1.92*
1.87*
3.10**
2.92**
2.04*
.10
2.33**
2.18*
2.26*
.70
1.40
.98

NOTE.-Thesestatisticsindicatethe mean differencein excess hedge returnsand call selectivity
returnsaccordingto call rank/stockrankcombination.The firstcolumnis the rankcombinationthat
is expectedto exhibithigherabnormalcall returnperformanceunderthe hypothesisthatValueLine
is ableto identifyunderpricedcall options. Tests of the assumptionof equalvariancesindicatedthat
the varianceswere sufficientlyunequalto warrantthe use of an approximatet-statisticdefinedas t
- RxH,Hs)I 1SXH,HL
forthe degrees
= (RXH,HL
+ SXH,HSInHS
andsimilarlyforRG,.The approximation
of freedomis
df =

(S2H,HLInHL + S2HHsIfnHs)2I[(S2HHLInHL)2I(nHL - 1) + (S2HHsInHs)2I(nHs

-

1)],

wherethe n's are the respectivesamplesizes.
* Significantat the .05 level.
** Significantat the .01 level.

call options. To test this, we collected all put recommendationsmade
duringthe 3-yearperiod. For our sample of 495 call recommendations,
there were only four stimultaneousput recommendations.This suggests that, in general, the basis for the recommendationsis not a judgment that the markethas underestimatedfuture stock price volatility.
Rather,for at least some of the recommendedcalls, Value Line must
believe that call options are low priced relative to put options. In this
section, we investigatethe extent to which relative call, put, and stock
prices correspondto option and stock rankingsin the period immediately before and after the recommendationdate.
All call options are ranked 1 on the recommendationdate, but the
underlyingstocks may carry rankingsof 1, 2, or 3. As described earlier, the lower the stock rank is, the more underpricedthe call option
is implicitlyjudged to be. To evaluate the extent to which calls are
low-pricedrelative to puts and stock, we employ the put-call parity
theoremfor Americanoptions on dividend-payingstocks and a procedure similarto one used by Finucane (1991) and Figlewski and Webb
(1993). In the case of known risk-free rates and up to three perfectly
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forecasted dividends, these stock price boundary conditions apply:
upper stock price boundarycondition:
S 5 CA

-

pB

+

PV(D) + K = UBt;

lower stock price boundarycondition:
St 2 CB-

pA

+ L = LBt.

In the equations above, St, Ct, and Pt are the time t stock, call,
and put prices, respectively, and B and A denote bid and ask prices,
respectively;PV(D) is the present value of the dividendspaid over the
life of the options, and L is the minimumof the present value of the
exercise price, K, the present value of the exercise price plus the
presentvalue of the first dividend, and so on throughthe last dividend
paid over the option's life. While there is no theoreticallocation of the
stock price within its upper and lower bounds, in cases where the
observed stock price falls relatively close to the lower boundary,call
options would be high-priced relative to puts and/or stock. Conversely, if the observed stock price is relatively close to the upper
boundary,call options are low-priced relative to puts and/or stock.
In order to evaluate the behavior of relative call, put, and stock
prices in the period surroundingthe recommendationdate, the following statistic is defined:
t

St -LBt

UBt-LBt

High (low) values of St indicate that call options are low (high)priced
relative to puts and/or stock.
For each recommended call option in our sample, we obtained a
correspondingput and call quote pair for 5 tradingdays before and 10
tradingdays after the recommendationdate, as well as the recommendation date itself. To qualify, the put quote had to occur within 5
minutesof the call quote, and each quote had to have the same associated stock price. We then calculatedthe statistics S' for each observation and computed means of the statistic separately for each event
day and rank combination. Value Line assigns ranks on the Tuesday
precedingthe recommendationdate, which correspondsto event day
-4. Thus, to be consistent with the Value Line rankingsystem, the
meanvalue of S' shouldbe directlyrelatedto the numericalstock rank
on event day - 4. The process of price adjustmentshouldsubsequently
cause differencesin the mean values of S' between rankcombinations
to disappearor become random.
Figure 3 presents the mean values of S' by event day and rank
combination.For each of the 5 tradingdays priorto the recommendation'date, the relative price of the call is directly related to the stock
rank. On the rank assignmentday, - 4, there is a spike in the statistic
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FIG.3.-Relative put, call, and stock prices aroundrecommendationdate.
The graphillustratesthe average of the statistics S' for each call/stock rank
combinationcentered aroundthe recommendationdate. Day 0 is the publication day of the issue in which Value Line recommendsthe call.

S' for the call/stock rank combination 1/3. The fact that these calls
are relativelylow priced in the context of the Americanput-callparity
relationshipis perfectly consistent with the assignmentof a call rank
of 1 and a stock rank of 3. The orderingaccordingto stock rank persists until Thursday of the recommendationweek, when the mean
value of S' for the rank combination 1/3 dips below that of the rank
combination1/2. Beyond this point the ordering appears to become
random.
E.

Some Additional Tests

As a check on our results, we employed an alternative measure of
abnormalcall returns. Cox and Rubinstein (1985, p. 322) show that
the call's expected percentage returncan be expressed as a weighted
average of the expected percentage return on the stock and the riskfree rate where the weight appliedto the stock's returnis the elasticity
of the call. Since the elasticity requiresonly the option's delta and the
option and stock prices, we can measure the call's expected return
anduse this in conjunctionwith the call's actual returnto calculate an
abnormalpercentagecall return.Applyingthis procedure,we obtained
results that were in complete agreementwith our previously reported
findingsfor the call selectivity and excess hedge returns.

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 14:04:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

562

Journal of Business

To examine the possible impact of outliers, we repeated the hedge
decomposition tests excluding the top and bottom 1% of the excess
hedge returns.Ourprimaryconclusions remainrobust. We also examined the performanceof the recommendationsaccordingto the moneyness of the calls, the time to expiration, and the volatility of the
underlyingstock. The results do not provide strong evidence that any
of these characteristicsaffect performance.At-the-moneycalls tended
to be slightly less mispriced, intermediate-and longer-termcalls were
slightlymore mispriced, and volatility was unrelatedto performance.
In orderto determinewhetherthe reportedresults are methodologydependent,we constructed a control sample of options. For each option in the Value Line sample, the procedure was as follows. First,
we collected all quotes on the recommendationdate for options that
had the same expirationdate and for which the absolute value of the
ratio of stock price to exercise price was within .02 of the ratiofor the
correspondingValue Line sampleoption. We then eliminatedduplicate
options and evaluated the last recorded quotes for each of these options on the preceding Tuesday, which is Value Line's analysis date.
The observed stock price and option ask price on this date were used
to calculate an impliedvolatility and this was used to generatea series
of seven option prices for stock prices centered around Tuesday's
recorded stock price. These stock and call prices correspond to the
limitprices providedby the Value Line recommendations.Using these
prices, the options were screened for purchase on the associated recommendationdate in the same way as the Value Line sample. In many
cases, more than one option per Value Line sampleoption was executable by Friday of the recommendationweek. In such cases, we retained the option whose moneyness ratio was closest to that of the
Value Line sample option. It was then necessary to estimate model
prices for the options in the control sample. This was accomplished
by observing the percentage premium of the model price above the'
quote price for each Value Line sample option on the execution date
and applyingthis same premiumto the correspondingcontrol sample
option. We then used the model price and the stock price on the execution date to calculate an implied standarddeviation for each of the
controlsampleoptions. This volatilityestimatewas then used throughout the event period to calculate model prices for the control sample.
The importantissue is whether the patternof call selectivity for the
control sample is similarto that observed for the Value Line sample.
If so, we would conclude that the methodology is generatingthe results.10Ourresults, however, indicate a distinctly differentpatternfor
the two samples. While we observe a large positive value for RG, for
10. This could result, for example, if our screeningproceduresystematicallyselects
quotes on day 0 that are in error.
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the Value Line sample on the first day of the holdingperiod, the statistic for the control sample is much smallerand insignificanton this day.
In contrastto the Value Line sample, where four of the call selectivity
returnsare significantlypositive over the first 10 days of the holding
period, none of the values of RG,are significantover this period for
the control sample. Both samples yield negative values of RG, on day
0, which indicates an increase in the differencebetween the model and
quote price. This is attributableto the screeningprocedureemployed
in which we select only those options satisfying the limit price. The
criticaldifferenceis that the day 0 gap between model and actualquote
price for the sample endures throughoutthe holdingperiod, while for
the Value Line sample the prices converge. These results do not support the notion that the results are methodology dependent.
We examined an alternative strategy, consisting of buying the call
when initiallyrecommendedand selling it when it was downgradedto
a rank of 2 or below. These tests omit cases where a call was downgradedand then upgradedback to a 1 and calls still held at the end of
the sampleperiod. These results includedthe full impactof the bid-ask
spread. The findingsrevealed that the positive benefit of tradingonly
rank 1 calls is still offset by the weight of the bid-ask spread and no
abnormalreturnsafter transactioncosts can be earned.
Finally, we examined two filter rules, one involving the execution
of trades when the limit price exceeded the ask price by at least $0.25
and the other involving trades when the limit price exceeded the ask
price by at least 15%. As would be expected, both rules produced
improvedresults with the 15%filterbeing the betterrule. However, the
improvementswere not sufficient to cover explicit transactioncosts.
F.

The Adjustment of hRstfor Risk

So far we have generateda numberof statistics on hRs,,the component
of the option's returnthat is accounted for by the stock. This figureis
a dollar amount and is not adjustedfor risk. A risk adjustment,such
as subtractinga risk premiumbased on the capitalasset pricingmodel,
would be difficultfor several reasons. The stock returnsare measured
at differentpoints duringa trade day, based on when the first option
transactionafter 10:00 A.M. occurred. It would be necessary to constructor have availabletick-by-tickdata on the stocks' prices plus the
market index to match simultaneouslywith the hRst returns. As an
alternative,we estimated the daily stock excess returnsfrom the file
of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). These returns
would match according to the day but would run from close-to-close
while the hRst series would run from the first call transaction after
10:00 A.M. on one day to the first call transactionafter 10:00 A.M. on
the next day. However, the CRSP returns should suffice for our purposes since we simply wish to determine if the excess stock returns
over the option holding periods were significant.
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Abnormalpercentagestock returnswere calculatedin the following
manner. For each call option, C, in the sample, the market model
parameters,

?cs,

and I3cs, were estimated for the underlying stock, S,

over the 250 tradingdays following the end of the holding period for
the option.11The abnormal stock return for day t, ARcs,, was then
computedas rs - [cs + oCSrMt],where rs and rM,are the actual day
t percentagereturnson stock S and on the CRSP value-weightedportfolio of New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange
stocks, respectively. Note that there may be multiple options on a
given day t that are written on the same stock and, unless the holding
periodsof these options terminateon the same day, the marketmodel
parametersused in calculatingexpected returnswill be estimatedover
differentperiods. It is, therefore, necessary to determinean average
abnormalreturnfor each stock for each day t. The averagepercentage
abnormalreturn for stock S on day t is defined as ARst = (1/N)
,c I [ARcst],where N is the number of call options in the sample
written on stock S on day t. We wish to test the abnormalreturn
performanceof stocks along two dimensions:(1) accordingto the rank
of the stock and (2) according to the call/stock rank combination.In
orderto develop an averagedaily abnormalreturnfor stocks of a given
rank K, the arithmetic average of ARst across all trading days and
stocks having rank K is calculated and is denoted ARK. The average
daily abnormalreturn for stocks having rank K and on which there
are options having rank L is calculated similarlyand denoted ARKL.
Our results, not shown here, revealed that the mean excess stock
returnover the option holdingperiod was not significantfor any of the
stock rank groups or combined call rank/stock rank combinations.
This result is not necessarily inconsistent with previous studies that
showed Value Line's superiorability to recommendstocks. Our tests
consisted of calls on stocks ranked 1, 2, 3, or 4. There were no cases
where the stock was ranked 5. Copeland and Mayers (1982) found
abnormalperformanceonly on stocks ranked 5. Moreover, their performancewas measuredover a period of 26 weeks after the stock had
been given a specific rank. The evidence in their table 4 shows a clear
11. In developingtimelinessrankingsfor commonstocks, ValueLine considersrecent
relative stock price performance.Stocks that performunusuallypositively relative to
the overall marketare assigned higher rankings,ceteris paribus,than stocks that underperformthe market.Thus, for highlyrankedstocks, beta estimationduringthe period
over which the stock exhibited positive relative price performancewould lead to an
upwardbias in the calculatedbeta. Using this beta estimate duringthe test period to
determineif there is an association between positive excess returnperformanceand
stock rankingsresults in an overstatementof the benchmarkreturnand a bias against
the findingof positive abnormalperformance.For low-rankedstocks the reverseis true.
The benchmarkreturnis understated,and there is a bias againstthe findingof negative
abnormalreturnperformance.The use of a future periodfor the calculationof benchmarkreturnsovercomes this problem.See Copelandand Mayers (1982).
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and logical tendency for the most significantperformanceto occur
shortlyafter the date on which the rank was assigned. This was confirmedby Stickel's (1985) results, which suggest that most of the response to a rank change occurs within a week. Our stock returnsare
measured over a period correspondingto the recommended option
holdingperiod. Since we do not have the necessary data, we are unable
to determinewhether the stock rank is reassigned at the time of the
optionrecommendation.However, the beginningof the option holding
periodwill not necessarily correspondto the reassignmentof a stock
rank.
Another interesting and related question is whether there is any
abnormalperformancein the underlyingstocks priorto the release of
the recommendationto purchase the call. To examine this issue, we
estimatedthe marketmodel parametersover a 250-trading-dayperiod
beginning250 days after the option is purchased. Since the longest
holding period was 189 calendar days, the future benchmarkperiod
would not overlap with any option holding period. We also used an
historical benchmark period and achieved similar results. Then we
estimatedexcess returnson the securities for a period of 60 days prior
to the purchase date to 60 days after the purchase date.12
Cumulativeaverage residuals are shown for the period of day - 60
to day + 60 in Figure 4. Several interestingresults are revealed. The
residuals are positive and rising for the period prior to day 0. This
result is not surprisingsince Value Line is known to pay attentionto
the recent performanceof the stock. On day 0, the averageresidualis
0.37%and has a t-statistic of 4.54. This is the largest average residual
and t-statisticover the entire 121-dayperiod. Combinedwith our earlier result, it is apparentthat the stock price rises sharply, and the
option mispricingis very large on the day the holding period begins.
Of course, we must be carefulnot to link these two findingstoo tightly.
The option returnis measured from approximately11:00A.M. on the
day it is purchased to approximately 11:00 A.M. the next day. The
stock returnis measured from the close on the day before the call is
purchaseduntil the close of the day the call is purchased.In addition,
there is the possibility that for some options, the purchasedate corresponds to the date of a stock rank change. Since we do not have data
on the stock ranks prior to the date the option is recommended,we
cannotaddressthis question. However, our findingsof significantpositive cumulative average residuals prior to the date the option is purchased confirms that call options are recommended on stocks that
show favorableperformance.
12. Recall that the first day of the holdingperiod does not necessarilycorrespondto
the date of the publicationof the recommendation.Fifty-eightpercent of the options
that could be boughtfor less than Value Line's limit price were boughton Monday.
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FIG. 4.-Cumulative average residuals of stocks on which Value Line recommendspurchases of the call option on day 0. Market model parameters
were estimated using a 250-day benchmarkperiod beginning250 days from
day 0.

Figure5 shows the cumulativeaverage residualsfor an event analysis in which day 0 is the day on which Value Line Options lowers the
call's rank to 3 or below and, thus, is the end of the holding period.
Significant negative average residuals of -0.39%, -0.52%, and
- 0.21%were observed on days - 7, - 6, - 5, and - 4. Day - 4 is the
day on which Value Line performs the analysis that downgradesthe
call. Thus, it appears that Value Line observes significantabnormal
negative performance on the stock and then lowers the call's rank.
This result is consistent with our first reportedfinding.Recall that we
found that Value Line's recommendationsto purchase calls revealed
abnormalperformancethat quickly dissipated. There is little evidence
that abnormalperformanceis earned by holding on to one's position
until Value Line gives its sell recommendation,which appears to be
triggeredby a sharp stock price move. Thus, Value Line seems to
have the ability to recommendwhen to open the position but not when
to close it.
V. Conclusions
This researchexamines call option rankingsand recommendationsappearingin Value Line Options over the period 1983-85. The objectives
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FIG. 5.-Cumulative average residuals of the stocks on which Value Line
lowers the rank of the call option to 3 or below on day 0. Market model
parameterswere estimated using a 250-daybenchmarkperiod beginning250
days from day 0.

of this research are to (1) determine whether there is informationin
Value Line's option rankingsand recommendationsand to (2) determine whether an investor following Value Line's option recommendations and prescribedstrategy earns abnormalreturns.
We find evidence of abnormalcall returnsin the period immediately
followingthe recommendedoption purchase date, which is consistent
with the results of Value Line Investment Survey stock rankingstudies.
An analysis of performanceaccordingto call rank and combined call
and stock rankalso supportsthe notion that Value Line rankingshave
informationcontent. Abnormalreturns were significantlypositive for
calls ranked 1. The largest and most significantabnormalcall return
performancewas exhibited by calls ranked 1 written on stocks whose
rankindicatedthat the stock was correctly priced. Hypothesis tests of
differences in abnormal call performance among different call and
stock rank combinations strongly support the ability of Value Line's
rankingsto discriminateex ante the performanceof call options.
Value Line's prescribedstrategy of buying call options and holding
them until they are no longer ranked 1 or 2 was found to yield significantlypositive abnormalreturnsbefore considerationof explicit transactions costs. After considerationof floor tradingand clearing costs,
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however, the strategy of forming riskless hedge portfolios and rebalancingon a daily basis does not generate excess returns.Thus, we do
not find evidence against marketefficiency.
An analysis of Value Line's put recommendationsindicated that
only four of the 495 calls in our sample had simultaneousput recommendations. This suggests that, in general, Value Line is not basing
its recommendationson judgmentsthat the markethas underestimated
future stock price volatility. Rather, Value Line must believe that call
options are low priced relative to put options and/or the underlying
stock. We employed the Americanput-callparityrelationshipto investigatethe extent to which call and stock rankingscorrespondto relative
call, put and stock prices. Our results are consistent with a ranking
system based on relative call, put, and stock prices in the week prior
to the recommendationdate.
The findingsof this study furtherconfirmValue Line's ability to ex
ante separate winners from losers. While we have not been able to
identifythe specific procedurebehind Value Line's recommendations,
we are relatively confident that it is based on perceived mispricing
of calls and is not simply a leveraging of its stock recommendation
performanceor the market's misestimationof the stock's volatility.
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